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Abstract
In a perfectly competitive market with a possibility of technological innovation we con-
trast guaranteed feed-in tariﬀs for electricity from renewables and tradable green certiﬁ-
cates from a dynamic eﬃciency and social welfare point of view. Speciﬁcally, we model
decisions about the technological innovation with convex costs within the framework of a
game-theoretic model, and discuss implications for optimal policy design under diﬀerent
assumptions regarding regulatory pre-commitment. We ﬁnd that for the case of technolog-
ical innovation with convex costs subsidy policies are preferable over quota-based policies.
Further, in terms of dynamic eﬃciency, no pre-commitment policies are shown to be at
least as good as the pre-commitment ones. Thus, a government with a preference for in-
novation being performed if the achievable cost reduction is high should be in favor of the
no pre-commitment regime.
Keywords: Renewable electricity; Feed-in tariﬀs; Regulatory pre-commitment; Tradable
green certiﬁcates; Quota target; Innovation; Energy policy
JEL classiﬁcation: Q42, Q48
1 Introduction
Renewable energy is considered an important element in a sustainable energy development.
In many countries renewable energy promotion policies have been put into place. As far
as electricity generation from renewables is concerned, there has been much debate in
recent years about the relative merits of guaranteed feed-in tariﬀs (FIT) and tradable
green certiﬁcates (TGC), mainly in the form of qualitative discussion (e.g. Menanteau
et al., 2003; Nielsen and Jeppesen, 2003; Berry, 2002), and much less so in the form of
more rigorous formal analysis (e.g. Amundsen and Mortensen, 2001, 2002; Amundsen and
Nese, 2002).
Building on seminal work by Weitzman (1974, 1978), Pizer (1999a,b) studies the non-
equivalence of tax and quota policies given uncertainty and shows that uncertainty causes
the optimal amount of emission abatement to increase, which justiﬁes a preference for price
over quantity control. Madlener et al. (2009) show that in terms of static eﬃciency a price
(subsidy) policy to promote renewable energy is equivalent to a quantity (quota) policy for a
competitive but not generally a duopoly market for power when competitors have diﬀerent
production costs for renewable (but not conventional) energy. In this paper, we extend the
static analysis to incorporate technological innovation that lowers the (increasing) marginal
cost of production of electricity from renewable sources.
From environmental economics it is known that the dynamic eﬃciency of a policy
depends on whether or not the government pre-commits to a certain policy target (e.g.
Denicolo`, 1999). In our analysis we want to ﬁnd out which of the two policy instruments
provides a stronger incentive for innovation favoring renewable or “green” electricity in
two cases, (1) when the government adjusts its policy in response to innovation (no pre-
commitment), and (2) when it cannot react immediately to innovation (pre-commitment).
In contrast to Denicolo` (1999), we ﬁnd that the relative merits of the subsidy and quota
policies are the same in the two scenarios from the point of view of social welfare maxi-
mization. However, in terms of dynamic eﬃciency, this equivalence does not necessarily
hold. Rather, the no pre-commitment policy is shown to support equilibrium outcomes
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with innovations that might not be attainable under pre-commitment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives optimal subsidy
and quota policies for assuming no pre-commitment on the part of the government when
innovation is present. Section 3 contains the analogous analysis for the pre-commitment
case. Section 4 discusses the results obtained in Sections 2 and 3 and concludes.
2 Optimal policy in the presence of innovation: no
pre-commitment case
In the no pre-commitment case, the government is assumed to have the information, ability
and obligation to respond to technological innovation by adjusting its subsidy or quota
policy, respectively. Let there be 푁 + 1 competitive electricity generators in the market,
one of them being the potential innovator, assumed to possess the patent covering the rights
for the new technology. Innovation reduces the marginal cost of green electricity, and the
innovator can license the new technology to other producers in return of a royalty. Let
us assume that prior to innovation all ﬁrms have an identical cost structure for producing
green electricity of the simplistic form
퐶g(푥g) = 푏1푥g + 푏2푥g
2, (1)
with 푏1 > 0, 푏2 > 0, to reﬂect decreasing marginal returns (DMR) in the production of green
electricity. DMR is a sensible assumption because the use of renewables (in particular solar
and wind) involves technologies that have not yet reached maturity. Accordingly, there is
scope for (exogenous) innovation, resulting in a new cost function of the form
퐶gn(푥g) = 푏1n푥g + 푏2푥g
2, (2)
where 퐶gn denotes the cost function after innovation and 푏1n < 푏1 the reduced part of
the marginal cost. Note that 푏2 is unaﬀected by the innovation for simplicity (푏1n < 푏1
is suﬃcient to mitigate DMR). Thus, (푏1 − 푏1푛) reﬂects the importance of the innovation.
2
The cost function for brown electricity (i.e. from conventional sources such as coal, nuclear
etc.) is assumed to be linear, 퐶b(푥b) = 푐b푥b.
The R&D investment required for the innovation is denoted by 푅[퐶g(푥g) − 퐶gn(푥g)],
with 푅′(⋅) > 0 and 푅′′(⋅) > 0. This means that the R&D outlay increases progressively as
a function of the size of the achievable cost reduction. Therefore, R&D does not display
increasing marginal returns, reﬂecting the fact that no particular technology has dominated
the market for renewable electricity to this day. Given the continuity assumptions made in
(1) and (2), for any ﬁxed value of 푥g, 푅[퐶g(푥g)−퐶gn(푥g)] can be rewritten as 푅(푏1− 푏1n).
We consider a parametric version of function 푅(⋅) of the form 푅(푏1 − 푏1n) = 푟(푏1 − 푏1n)2,
with parameter 푟 > 0 reﬂecting the concavity of the function. In particular, the higher 푟,
the higher the marginal cost of innovation.
On the demand side, we assume that brown and green electricity are perfect substitutes.
Thus the demand function for electricity takes the following linear form:
푝(푄) = 푎−푄 = 푎−
푁+1∑
푖=1
(푥ib + 푥ig) ,
where 푄 denotes the total quantity of electricity supplied in the market, 푥푖푏, the quantity
of conventional electricity produced by ﬁrm 푖, and 푥푖푔, that of green electricity. Further,
we assume that 푏1 < 푐푏, i.e. marginal costs of green electricity are lower than those of
brown electricity for small quantities, and (푐푏 − 푏1푛) is suﬃciently smaller than 푏2(푎− 푐푏),
i.e. the average electricity price on the market, 푝, will always be given by the marginal
cost of brown electricity 푐푏.
The government observes whether a ﬁrm operates with the old or the new technology1
and is assumed to maximize social welfare. The externality function of green electricity2
(including avoided social cost of producing brown electricity) is assumed to have a simple,
1This is a plausible assumption since, in reality, the electricity producers are required to ﬁle the technical
description of their power generating technology to the regulator.
2Note that, in the real world, the quantiﬁcation of the (positive and negative) externalities associated
with power generation from renewables is subject to several complications (e.g. So¨derholm and Sundqvist,
2003). The value of the external beneﬁts (including avoided environmental damages and learning-by-doing
eﬀects) is likely to depend on the particular composition of the technology portfolio used to produce
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linear-quadratic form:
퐷(푥g) = 푑1푥g − 푑2푥2g, 푑1, 푑2 > 0. (3)
The quadratic term reﬂects the fact that marginal avoided social cost of brown electricity
decreases with higher quantities of green electricity produced and might attain negative
values if large quantities of green electricity are produced.3 In order to exclude the possi-
bility of extremely high social cost of additional production of green power, we additionally
assume that parameter 푑2 is suﬃciently small such that 푑2(푁 + 1)(푐b − 푏1n) < 푏2푑1.
2.1 Subsidy policy
Subsidy (or negative tax) here refers to a transfer paid by the government or electricity
consumers to the suppliers of green electricity. Thus, producers receive a surcharge 푠 per
unit of green electricity.4 The decisions of the agents can be represented by a game with
the following players: ﬁrms 1, 2, . . . , 푁 +1, and government 퐺. Without loss of generality,
let us assume that ﬁrm no. 1 is the potential innovator.
Now we analyze the decision sequencing under subsidy control with no pre-commitment.
There are three decision stages, described in the following and summarized in Figure 1.
Stage I. Firm 1 decides either not to innovate (푁퐼), to innovate and oﬀer 푁 licenses
in the competition stage III (퐼푁 ), or to innovate and oﬀer no licenses in stage III (퐼0).
Stage II. Given the decision of ﬁrm 1 in stage I, the government determines the subsidy
levels for non-innovating and innovating ﬁrms in order to maximize social welfare.
(IIa) If ﬁrm 1 did not innovate, the government introduces a subsidy 푠푁퐼 per unit of output
for all ﬁrms (decision node 퐺1).
electricity, and thus also the amount of the brown electricity displaced and the (environmental) beneﬁt
incurred.
3This can be motivated by arguing that with more intensive utilization of renewables, environmentally
and socially less benign projects are also being realized.
4In reality it is usually the power fed into the grid that counts, which due to on-site electricity consump-
tion and transmission losses may be considerably less than gross production. This diﬀerence is neglected
here for simplicity.
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Figure 1: Extensive-form game representation, no pre-commitment case, subsidy policy
(IIb) If ﬁrm 1 did innovate and announced to oﬀer 푁 licenses in stage III, the government
introduces two levels of subsidy: 푠퐼푁 for the innovator and the ﬁrms that adopted
the new technology and 푠푁퐼푁 for the ﬁrms that did not adopt the new technology
(decision node 퐺2).
(IIc) Finally, if ﬁrm 1 did innovate but announced that it will oﬀer no licenses in stage III,
the subsidies are 푠퐼0 for the innovator and 푠푁퐼0 for the competitors (decision node
퐺3).
Stage III. Given the innovation decision of ﬁrm 1 and the decision of the government
about the subsidy level, ﬁrms 1, 2, . . . , 푁 + 1 compete in quantities.
(IIIa) If ﬁrm 1 did not innovate, all ﬁrms have identical cost functions 퐶g(⋅) and compete
in quantities given subsidy level 푠푁퐼 per unit of green electricity (subgame Γ푁퐼).
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(IIIb) If ﬁrm 1 did innovate and committed to oﬀer 푁 licenses in stage III, then it ﬁrst
oﬀers licenses to 푁 competitors in return of a royalty 휐 given subsidy levels 푠퐼푁 and
푠푁퐼푁 . Firms 2, . . . , 푁 + 1 can either accept (퐼) or reject (푁퐼) this oﬀer. Since ﬁrms
2, . . . , 푁 + 1 are identical, we assume that either all of them will reject the oﬀer
and operate with cost function 퐶g(⋅) (competition in quantities will take place in
subgame Γ퐼푁 ,푁퐼) or all of them will accept it and operate with cost function 퐶gn(⋅)
(competition in subgame Γ퐼푁 ,퐼).
(IIIc) If ﬁrm 1 did innovate but announced that it will oﬀer no licenses in stage III, then
ﬁrm 1, operating with cost function 퐶gn(⋅), and ﬁrms 2, . . . , 푁 + 1, operating with
cost function 퐶g(⋅), respectively, compete in quantities given their subsidy levels 푠퐼0
and 푠푁퐼0 (subgame Γ퐼0).
These three decision stages deﬁne an extensive-form game as shown in Figure 1. The
information revealed in the earlier stages of this game is taken as given in the corresponding
subsequent stages. Thus, in the earlier stages, rational players anticipate the equilibrium
outcomes in every subsequent stage. Each game branch starting with an information set
can thus be considered as a subgame, giving rise to the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
(SPE) as the solution concept to be applied. As usual, the SPE solution can be obtained
by backward induction.
Lemma 2.1.1. In subgame Γ푁퐼 (stage IIIa), all ﬁrms’ quantities of green electricity are
given by
푥푖g(푁퐼, 푠푁퐼) =
푐b − 푏1 + 푠푁퐼
2푏2
. (4)
Proof: see Appendix on p.25.
Lemma 2.1.2. In stage IIIb, ﬁrm 1’s equilibrium oﬀer 휐∗ is given by
휐∗ =
⎧⎨
⎩
(푏1 − 푏1n)− (푠푁퐼푁 − 푠퐼푁 ) if (푏1 − 푏1n)− (푠푁퐼푁 − 푠퐼푁 ) <
푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼푁
2
;
푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼푁
2
otherwise.
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This oﬀer is always accepted by a ﬁrm of type 2 in equilibrium5. Quantities of green
electricity produced by ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrms of type 2 are
푥1g(퐼푁 , (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 )) =
푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼푁
2푏2
;
푥2g(퐼푁 , (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 )) =
⎧⎨
⎩
(푐푏 − 푏1 + 푠푁퐼푁 )
2푏2
if (푏1 − 푏1n)− (푠푁퐼푁 − 푠퐼푁 ) <
푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼푁
2
;
푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼푁
4푏2
otherwise.
Proof: see Appendix on p.26.
Lemma 2.1.3. In subgame Γ퐼0 (stage IIIc), quantities of green electricity produced by ﬁrm
1 and ﬁrms of type 2 are given by
푥1g(퐼0, (푠푁퐼0, 푠퐼0)) =
푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼0
2푏2
;
푥2g(퐼0, (푠푁퐼0, 푠퐼0)) =
푐b − 푏1 + 푠푁퐼0
2푏2
.
Proof: see Appendix on p.28.
Lemma 2.1.4. In stage IIa (subgame starting at node 퐺1), the government chooses subsidy
level
푠∗푁퐼 =
푏2푑1 − 푑2(푁 + 1)(푐b − 푏1)
푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)
.
Proof: see Appendix on p.28.
Lemma 2.1.5. In stage IIb (subgame starting at node 퐺2), the government chooses any
combination of subsidy levels
(푠∗푁퐼푁 , 푠
∗
퐼푁
) =
(
푠∗푁퐼푁 ,
[2푏2푁 − 푑2(푁 + 2)2](푐b − 푏1n) + 2(푁 + 2)푏2푑1
푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2
)
,
where
푠∗푁퐼푁 ≥ (푏1 − 푏1n) +
[푏2(푁 − 2)− 푑2(푁 + 2)2](푐b − 푏1n) + (푁 + 2)푏2푑1
푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2
.
5As usual, we assume that in the case of indiﬀerence ﬁrms of type 2 decide in favor of the adoption of
the new technology.
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Proof: see Appendix on p.29.
Lemma 2.1.6. In stage IIc (subgame starting at node 퐺3), the government chooses subsidy
levels
푠∗푁퐼0 = 푠
∗
퐼0
=
푏2푑1 − 푑2(푁 + 1)(푐b − 푏1)− 푑2(푏1 − 푏1n)
푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)
.
Proof: see Appendix on p.30.
Proposition 2.1.7. The subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies on the equilibrium path
of the innovation game with subsidy control and no pre-commitment policy are given as
follows. Firm 1 does not innovate (푁퐼) if (푟 − 1)(Δ푏1)2 + 2훽Δ푏1 − 훼훽2 ≤ 0 where
훼 =
푏2
4
(
2(푁 + 2)3
[4푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 2)2]2
− 1
[푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)]2
)
> 0;
훽 = 푐b − 푏1n + 푑1 > 0;
Δ푏1 = 푏1 − 푏1n
and innovates and oﬀers 푁 licenses (퐼푁) otherwise. The royalty and quantities in equilib-
rium are given by
휐∗ =
푏2(푁 + 2)(푐b − 푏1n + 푑1)
푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2
;
푥∗1g(푁퐼) =
푐b − 푏1 + 푑1
2[푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)]
; 푥∗1g(퐼푁) =
(푁 + 2)(푐b − 푏1n + 푑1)
푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2
.
Government sets subsidy levels
푠∗푁퐼 =
푏2푑1 − 푑2(푁 + 1)(푐b − 푏1)
푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)
,
푠∗푁퐼푁 ∈
{
푠 : 푠 ≤ [푏2(푁 − 2)− 푑2(푁 + 2)
2](푐b − 푏1 + 푑1) + 푏2(푁 + 2)(푏1 − 푏1n)
4푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 2)2
+ 푑1
}
,
푠∗퐼푁 =
[2푏2푁 − 푑2(푁 + 2)2](푐b − 푏1n) + 2(푁 + 2)푏2푑1
푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2
.
Firms of type 2 innovate (퐼) if ﬁrm 1 chooses 퐼푁 and produce quantities
푥∗2g(푁퐼) =
푐b − 푏1 + 푑1
2[푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)]
,
푥∗2g(퐼푁) =
(푁 + 2)(푐b − 푏1n + 푑1)
2[푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2]
.
Proof: see Appendix on p.30.
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2.2 Quota-based policy
Instead of subsidizing green electricity, the government can also impose a quota target
for green power on each generator.6 For each unit of green electricity produced, the ﬁrm
receives a certiﬁcate providing evidence of partial satisfaction of the target imposed7. If
a ﬁrm falls short of achieving the quota target, it faces a ﬁne 푓 that increases with the
shortfall (cf. Madlener et al., 2009).
As with the subsidy-based policy, we consider an extensive-form game with the following
structure. There are three decision stages.
Stage I. Firm 1 decides either not to innovate (푁퐼), to innovate and oﬀer 푁 licenses
in the competition stage III (퐼푁 ), or to innovate and oﬀer no royalties in stage III (퐼0).
Stage II. Given the decision of ﬁrm 1 in stage I, the government determines the
quotas to be satisﬁed and the ﬁnes for ﬁrms falling short of the quota for non-innovating
and innovating ﬁrms, in order to maximize social welfare.
(IIa) If ﬁrm 1 did not innovate, the government introduces a quota 푥¯푁퐼 and a ﬁne 푓푁퐼 per
unit of output falling short of the quota for all ﬁrms (decision node 퐺1).
(IIb) If ﬁrm 1 did innovate and announced to oﬀer 푁 licenses in stage III, the government
introduces two pairs of quotas and ﬁnes: (푥¯퐼푁 , 푓퐼푁 ) for the innovator and those ﬁrms
that adopted the new technology and (푥¯푁퐼푁 , 푓푁퐼푁 ) for those ﬁrms that did not adopt
the new technology (퐺2).
(IIc) Finally, if ﬁrm 1 did innovate but announced that it will oﬀer no licenses in stage
III, the quotas and ﬁnes set by the government are (푥¯퐼0 , 푓퐼0) for the innovator and
(푥¯푁퐼0 , 푓푁퐼0) for the competitors (퐺3).
6In practice it is often the wholesalers or retailers, and sometimes even the ﬁnal consumers of electricity,
that are obligated to fulﬁl the quota target.
7Admittedly, the assumption that the market for tradable certiﬁcates is perfectly competitive and
eﬃcient may, especially in poorly designed or managed schemes, be quite a strong one (e.g. Amundsen
and Bergman, 2004; Nilsson and Sundqvist, 2007; So¨derholm, 2008).
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Figure 2: Extensive-form game representation, no pre-commitment case, quota policy.
The actions of the government 휎푖 for each node 퐺푖, 푖 = 1, 2, 3, are deﬁned as follows:
휎1 = (푥¯푁퐼 , 푓푁퐼), 휎2 = ((푥¯푁퐼푁 , 푓푁퐼푁 ), (푥¯퐼푁 , 푓퐼푁 )), 휎3 = ((푥¯퐼0 , 푓퐼0), (푥¯푁퐼0 , 푓푁퐼0)).
Stage III. Given the innovation decision of ﬁrm 1 and the decision of the government
about the quotas and ﬁnes, ﬁrms 1, 2, . . . , 푁 + 1 compete in quantities.
(IIIa) If ﬁrm 1 did not innovate, all ﬁrms have an identical cost function 퐶g(⋅) and compete
in quantities given the quota and ﬁne levels (푥¯푁퐼 , 푓푁퐼) (subgame Γ
푞
푁퐼).
(IIIb) If ﬁrm 1 did innovate and announced to oﬀer 푁 licenses in stage III, then ﬁrm 1
ﬁrst oﬀers licenses to 푁 competitors for a royalty 휐푞, given the quota and the ﬁne
levels (푥¯퐼푁 , 푓퐼푁 ), (푥¯푁퐼푁 , 푓푁퐼푁 ). Firms 2, 3, . . . , 푁 + 1 (ﬁrms of type 2) can accept
or reject this oﬀer. Since ﬁrms of type 2 are identical, we assume that either all of
them will reject the oﬀer and operate with the new cost function 퐶g(⋅) (competition
in quantities will take place in subgame Γ푞퐼푁 ,푁퐼) or all of them will accept it and
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operate with cost function 퐶gn(⋅) (competition in subgame Γ푞퐼푁 ,퐼).
(IIIc) If ﬁrm 1 did innovate but announced that it will oﬀer no licenses in stage III, then
ﬁrm 1, operating with cost function 퐶gn(⋅), and ﬁrms of type 2, operating with cost
function 퐶g(⋅), compete in quantities, given their quota and ﬁne levels (푥¯퐼0 , 푓퐼0),
(푥¯푁퐼0 , 푓푁퐼0) (subgame Γ
푞
퐼0
).
These three decision stages deﬁne an extensive-form game as shown in Figure 2. Like
in the subsidy case, we apply the solution concept of the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
(SPE).
Lemma 2.2.1. In stage IIIa (subgame Γ푞푁퐼), all ﬁrms produce quantity
푥푖g(푁퐼, 푓푁퐼) =
푐b − 푏1 + 푓푁퐼
2푏2
.
Proof: see Appendix on p.31.
Lemma 2.2.2. In stage IIIb, ﬁrm 1’s equilibrium oﬀer 휐푞∗ is given by
휐∗푞 =
⎧⎨
⎩
휐푞max if 휐푞max <
푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁
2
;
푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁
2
otherwise.
where
휐푞max =
√
(푐b − 푏1 + 푓퐼푁 )2 + 4푏2(푓푁퐼푁 푥¯푁퐼푁 − 푓퐼푁 푥¯퐼푁 )− (푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁 ).
This oﬀer is always accepted by ﬁrms of type 2 in the equilibrium8. Firm 1 produces quantity
푥1g(퐼푁 , (푓푁퐼푁 , 푓퐼푁 ), 휐
푞) =
푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁
2푏2
.
The quantity of green electricity produced by any ﬁrm of type 2, 푥2g(퐼푁 , (푓푁퐼푁 , 푓퐼푁 , 푥¯퐼푁 , 푥¯푁퐼푁 )),
amounts to⎧⎨
⎩
2(푐푏 − 푏1 + 푓푁퐼푁 )−
√
(푐b − 푏1 + 푓퐼푁 )2 + 4푏2(푓푁퐼푁 푥¯푁퐼푁 − 푓퐼푁 푥¯퐼푁 )
2푏2
if 휐푞max <
푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁
2
;
푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁
4푏2
otherwise.
8By assumption, ﬁrms of type 2 adopt the new technology if indiﬀerent.
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Proof: see Appendix on p.32.
Lemma 2.2.3. In stage IIIb (subgame Γ푞퐼0), quantities of green electricity produced by ﬁrm
1 and ﬁrms of type 2, respectively, are given by
푥1g(퐼0, 푓푁퐼0) =
푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼0
2푏2
;
푥2g(퐼0, 푓푁퐼0) =
푐b − 푏1 + 푓푁퐼0
2푏2
.
Proof: see Appendix on p.34.
Lemma 2.2.4. In stage IIa (subgame starting at node 퐺1), the government chooses ﬁne
level
푓 ∗푁퐼 =
푏2푑1 − 푑2(푁 + 1)(푐b − 푏1)
푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)
,
while the quota level 푥¯푁퐼 can be deliberately set by the government.
Proof: see Appendix on p.34.
Lemma 2.2.5. In stage IIb (subgame starting at node 퐺2), the optimal decision of the
government is given by any combination of ﬁnes
(푓 ∗푁퐼푁 , 푓
∗
퐼푁
) =
(
푓 ∗푁퐼푁 ,
[2푏2푁 − 푑2(푁 + 2)2](푐b − 푏1n) + 2(푁 + 2)푏2푑1
푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2
)
where 푓 ∗푁퐼푁 satisﬁes inequality√
(푐b − 푏1 + 푓 ∗퐼푁 )2 + 4푏2(푓 ∗푁퐼푁 푥¯푁퐼푁 − 푓 ∗퐼푁 푥¯퐼푁 ) ≥
3
2
(푐b − 푏1n + 푓 ∗퐼푁 ). (5)
The government’s choice of quotas 푥¯푁퐼푁 , 푥¯퐼푁 is constrained by inequality (5).
Proof: see Appendix on p.35.
Lemma 2.2.6. In stage IIc (subgame starting at node 퐺3), government chooses ﬁne levels
푓 ∗푁퐼0 = 푓
∗
퐼0
=
푏2푑1 − 푑2(푁 + 1)(푐b − 푏1)− 푑2(푏1 − 푏1n)
푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)
.
Proof: see Appendix on p.36.
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Proposition 2.2.7. The subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies on the equilibrium path of
this game are given as follows. Firm 1 does not innovate (푁퐼) if Δ푏1 ∈
(
0,
√
퐵2−4퐴퐶−퐵
2퐴
]
,
where
퐴 =
푏2
4[푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)]2 + 푟
> 0;
퐵 =
푑2(푁 + 1)
푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)
푥¯푁퐼 − 2푏2
4[푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)]2훽
;
퐶 = −훼훽2 −
(
푑2(푁 + 1)
푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)
+ 푑1
)
푥¯푁퐼 −
(
푑2(푁 + 2)
2 − 2푏2푁
4푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 2)2
훽 + 푑1
)
푥¯퐼 < 0
with
훼 =
푏2
4
(
2(푁 + 2)3
[4푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 2)2]2
− 1
[푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)]2
)
> 0;
훽 = 푐b − 푏1n + 푑1 > 0,
and innovates and oﬀers 푁 licenses (퐼푁) otherwise. It oﬀers 푁 licenses in return of a
royalty
휐∗푞 =
푏2(푁 + 2)(푐b − 푏1n + 푑1)
푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2
and produces quantities of green electricity
푥∗1g(푁퐼) =
푐b − 푏1 + 푑1
2[푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)]
,
푥∗1g(퐼푁) =
(푁 + 2)(푐b − 푏1n + 푑1)
푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2
.
Government chooses ﬁne levels
푓 ∗푁퐼 =
푏2푑1 − 푑2(푁 + 1)(푐b − 푏1)
푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)
,
푓 ∗푁퐼푁 ≥
{[2푏2푁 − (푁 + 2)2푑2](푐b − 푏1n) + 2(푁 + 2)푏2푑1} 푥¯퐼
푥¯푁퐼
+
5 [2푏2푁(푐b − 푏1n)− 푑2(푁 + 2)2(푏1 − 푏1n) + 2(푁 + 2)푏2푑1 − 4푏2푏1]2
16푏2[4푏2 + (푁 + 2)2푑2]2푥¯푁퐼
,
푓 ∗퐼푁 =
[2푏2푁 − 푑2(푁 + 2)2](푐b − 푏1n) + 2(푁 + 2)푏2푑1
푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2
.
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Firms of type 2 innovate (퐼) if ﬁrm 1 oﬀered 푁 licenses and produce quantities
푥∗2g(푁퐼) =
푐b − 푏1 + 푑1
2[푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)]
,
푥∗2g(퐼푁) =
(푁 + 2)(푐b − 푏1n + 푑1)
2[푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2]
.
Proof: see Appendix on p.36.
2.3 Comparison between subsidy and quota-based policies
In Madlener et al. (2009) it is shown that, in perfectly competitive markets, subsidy and
quota policies are equivalent in terms of social welfare maximization. In this study, we
have particularly shown that in the subgame-perfect equilibria all ﬁne levels correspond to
the subsidy levels.
However, the allocation of welfare to producer vs. consumer surplus diﬀers under these
two alternative policies. In particular, the proﬁts achieved by the potential innovator as
well as by its competitors are lower under the quota policy (휋푞) than under the subsidy
policy (휋푠) regime:
휋
푞
1(푁퐼) = 휋
푠
1(푁퐼)− 푓 ∗(푁퐼)푥¯푁퐼 ;
휋
푞
2(푁퐼) = 휋
푠
2(푁퐼)− 푓 ∗(푁퐼)푥¯푁퐼 ;
휋
푞
1(퐼푁 ) = 휋
푠
1(퐼푁)− 푓 ∗(퐼푁)푥¯퐼푁 ;
휋
푞
2(퐼푁 ) = 휋
푠
2(퐼푁)− 푓 ∗(퐼푁)푥¯퐼푁 .
Thus, given a no pre-commitment policy, the ﬁrms have a strict preference for price rather
then quantity controls.
Next, we want to investigate under which policy regime (subsidy or quota) the incentives
to innovate are higher. Therefore, we compare the diﬀerences of proﬁts of the potential
innovator (ﬁrm 1) with or without innovation under both regimes. For the subsidy policy,
this gain from innovation amounts to
Δ휋푠1 = 휋
푠
1(퐼푁)− 휋푠1(푁퐼).
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Under the quota policy, the corresponding proﬁt diﬀerence is
Δ휋푞1 = 휋
푞
1(퐼푁 )− 휋푞1(푁퐼).
The incentives to innovate are higher under the subsidy policy if
Δ휋푠1 −Δ휋푞1 = 푓 ∗퐼푁 푥¯퐼푁 − 푓 ∗푁퐼 푥¯푁퐼 > 0. (6)
Suppose that the diﬀerence between the quota levels (푥¯퐼푁 − 푥¯푁퐼) is suﬃciently small. Then
it can be shown that under the assumption that 푑2(푁 + 1)(푐b − 푏1n) < 푏2푑1, as made in
our model, condition (6) is satisﬁed. Therefore, not only is the subsidy policy preferred
by proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms but it also provides a higher incentive to innovate, which is an
interesting ﬁnding.
3 Optimal policy in the presence of innovation: pre-
commitment case
In the pre-commitment case, the government is assumed to stick to its green electricity
policy (in terms of subsidy and quota) even under innovation. Possible reasons for pre-
commitment include: imperfect information, limited ability for short-run policy adjust-
ments etc. Compared to the no pre-commitment assumption, pre-commitment appears
to be more realistic, because in the real world there are always diﬃculties in adjusting
policies, for reasons like the ones described above. Besides, there may be other costs as-
sociated with policy adjustment, similar to the menu costs in the price adjustment case,
that further stymies quick policy reaction to innovations.
We maintain the basic assumptions made in the no pre-commitment case, except that
the quota and subsidy levels remain unchanged after the innovation has occurred.
3.1 Subsidy policy
We consider an extensive-form game presented in Fig. 3. There are two decision stages.
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Figure 3: Extensive-form game representation, pre-commitment case, subsidy policy
Stage I. Firm 1 decides either not to innovate (푁퐼), to innovate and oﬀer 푁 licenses
in the competition stage II (퐼푁), or to innovate and oﬀer no licenses in stage II (퐼0).
Simultaneously, the government determines the subsidy levels 푠˜푁퐼 for non-innovating and
푠˜퐼 for innovating ﬁrms in order to maximize social welfare.
Stage II. Given the innovation decision of ﬁrm 1 and the decision of the government
about the subsidy level, ﬁrms 1, 2, . . . , 푁 + 1 compete in quantities.
(IIa) If ﬁrm 1 did not innovate, all ﬁrms have identical cost functions 퐶g(⋅) and compete
in quantities given the subsidy level 푠˜푁퐼 per unit of green electricity (subgame Γ˜푁퐼).
(IIb) If ﬁrm 1 did innovate and announced to oﬀer 푁 licenses in stage II, then it ﬁrst oﬀers
licenses to 푁 competitors in return of a royalty 휐˜ given the subsidy levels 푠˜퐼 and 푠˜푁퐼 .
Firms 2, 3, . . . , 푁 + 1 can either accept or reject this oﬀer. Since ﬁrms 2, 3, . . . ,
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푁+1 are identical, we assume that either all of them will reject the oﬀer and operate
with cost function 퐶g(⋅) (competition in quantities will take place in subgame Γ˜퐼,푁퐼)
or all of them will accept it and operate with cost function 퐶gn(⋅) (competition in
subgame Γ˜퐼,퐼).
(IIc) If ﬁrm 1 did innovate but announced that it will oﬀer no licenses in stage 3, then
ﬁrm 1, operating with cost function 퐶gn(⋅), and ﬁrms 2, 3, . . . , 푁 + 1, operating
with cost function 퐶g(⋅), compete in quantities given their subsidy levels 푠˜퐼 and 푠˜푁퐼 ,
respectively.
Proposition 3.1.1. There exist two sets of subgame-perfect equilibria in the innovation
game with subsidy control and pre-commitment policy. The subgame-perfect equilibrium
strategies on the equilibrium path of these two sets are given as follows.
Set 1. Firm 1 does not innovate (푁퐼) and produces quantity
푥∗1g(푁퐼, (푠˜
∗1
푁퐼 , 푠˜
∗1
퐼 )) =
푐b − 푏1 + 푑1
2[푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)]
of green electricity. Government chooses subsidy levels (푠˜∗1푁퐼 , 푠˜
∗1
퐼 ) such that
푠˜∗1푁퐼 =
푏2푑1 − 푑2(푁 + 1)(푐b − 푏1)
푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)
;
푠˜∗1퐼 ∈
[
−(푐b − 푏1n)±
√
2푏2
푁 + 2
(
푏2(푐b − 푏1 + 푑1)2
[푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)]2
+ 4푟(Δ푏1)2
)]
.
Firms of type 2 produce quantity
푥∗2g(푁퐼, (푠˜
∗1
푁퐼 , 푠˜
∗1
퐼 )) =
푐b − 푏1 + 푑1
2[푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)]
of green electricity.
Set 2. Firm 1 innovates and oﬀers 푁 licenses (퐼푁) in return of a royalty
휐˜∗ =
푏2(푁 + 2)(푐b − 푏1 + 푑1)
푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2
per unit of green electricity produced by ﬁrms of type 2 and itself produces quantity
푥∗1g(퐼푁 , (푠˜
∗2
푁퐼 , 푠˜
∗2
퐼 ) =
(푁 + 2)(푐b − 푏1n + 푑1)
푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2
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of green electricity. Government sets subsidy levels (푠˜∗2푁퐼 , 푠˜
∗2
퐼 ) such that
푠˜∗2푁퐼 ∈
[
−(푐b − 푏1)±
√
푏2
(
푏2(푁 + 2)3(푐b − 푏1n + 푑1)2
[4푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 2)2]2
− 4푟(Δ푏1)2
)]
;
푠˜∗2퐼 =
[2푏2푁 − 푑2(푁 + 2)2](푐b − 푏1n) + 2(푁 + 2)푏2푑1
푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2
.
Firms of type 2 innovate (퐼) and produce quantity
푥∗2g(퐼푁 , (푠˜
∗2
푁퐼 , 푠˜
∗2
퐼 ) =
(푁 + 2)(푐b − 푏1n + 푑1)
2[푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2]
of green electricity.
Proof: see Appendix on p.37.
3.2 Quota-based policy
Now we consider an extensive-form game with the structure presented in Figure 4. As
under the subsidy policy, there are two decision stages.
Stage I. Firm 1 decides either not to innovate (푁퐼), to innovate and oﬀer 푁 licenses
in the competition stage II (퐼푁), or to innovate and oﬀer no licenses in stage II (퐼0).
Simultaneously, the government determines the ﬁne levels 푓˜푁퐼 for non-innovating and 푓˜퐼
for innovating ﬁrms in order to maximize social welfare.
Stage II. Given the innovation decision of ﬁrm 1 and the decision of the government
about the subsidy level, ﬁrms 1, 2, . . . , 푁 + 1 compete in quantities.
(IIa) If ﬁrm 1 did not innovate, all ﬁrms have identical cost functions 퐶g(⋅) and compete
in quantities given the ﬁne level 푓˜푁퐼 per unit of green electricity (subgame Γ˜
푞
푁퐼).
(IIb) If ﬁrm 1 did innovate and announced to oﬀer 푁 licenses in stage II, then it ﬁrst oﬀers
licenses to 푁 competitors in return of a royalty 휐˜푞 given the ﬁne levels 푓˜퐼 and 푓˜푁퐼 .
Firms 2, 3, . . . , 푁 + 1 can either accept or reject this oﬀer. Since ﬁrms 2, 3, . . . ,
푁+1 are identical, we assume that either all of them will reject the oﬀer and operate
with cost function 퐶g(⋅) (competition in quantities will take place in subgame Γ˜푞퐼,푁퐼)
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Figure 4: Extensive-form game representation, pre-commitment case, quota policy
or all of them will accept it and operate with cost function 퐶gn(⋅) (competition in
subgame Γ˜푞퐼,퐼).
(IIc) If ﬁrm 1 did innovate but announced that it will oﬀer no licenses in stage 3, then ﬁrm
1, operating with cost function 퐶gn(⋅), and ﬁrms 2, 3, . . . , 푁 +1, operating with cost
function 퐶g(⋅), compete in quantities given their ﬁne levels 푓˜퐼 and 푓˜푁퐼 , respectively.
Proposition 3.2.1. There exist two sets of subgame-perfect equilibria strategies in the
pre-commitment game with quotas. The subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies on the equi-
librium path of this game are given as follows.
Set 1. Firm 1 does not innovate (푁퐼) and produces quantity
푥∗1g(푁퐼, (푓˜
∗1
푁퐼 , 푓˜
∗1
퐼 )) =
푐b − 푏1 + 푑1
2[푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)]
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of green electricity. Government sets ﬁne levels (푓˜ ∗1푁퐼 , 푓˜
∗1
퐼 ) such that
푓˜ ∗1푁퐼 =
푏2푑1 − 푑2(푁 + 1)(푐b − 푏1)
푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)
;
푓˜ ∗1퐼 ∈
[
−(푐b − 푏1n) + 4푏2푥¯퐼 ± 휉
√
2푏2
(푁 + 2)[푏2 + (푁 + 1)푑2]
]
,
where 푥¯퐼 denotes the minimum quota to be produced by an innovating ﬁrm, and
휉 =
√
8푏32푥¯
2
퐼 + 4(푁 + 1)
2(푁 + 2)푑22훿 + 4푏
2
2휖+ 푏2휂,
with
훿 = 푟(Δ푏1)
2 − (푐b − 푏1n)푥¯퐼 − (푐b − 푏1)푥¯푁퐼 ;
휖 = (푁 + 2)푟(Δ푏1)
2 + 4(푁 + 1)푑2푥¯
2
퐼 − (푁 + 2)[(푐b − 푏1n)푥¯퐼 + 푑1푥¯푁퐼 ];
휂 = (푁 + 2)[(푐b − 푏1 + 푑1)2 − 2푐b푑1] +
+4(푁 + 1)푑2[2(푁 + 2)푟(Δ푏1)
2 + 2(푁 + 1)푑2푥¯
2
퐼 + 2푏1n푥¯퐼 − (푁 + 2)(푐b + 푏1)푥¯푁퐼)].
Firms of type 2 produce quantity
푥∗2g(푁퐼, (푓˜
∗1
푁퐼 , 푓˜
∗1
퐼 )) =
푐b − 푏1 + 푑1
2[푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)]
of green electricity.
Set 2. Firm 1 innovates and oﬀers 푁 licenses (퐼푁) in return of a royalty
휐˜∗푞 =
푏2(푁 + 2)(푐b − 푏1n + 푑1)
푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2
per unit of green electricity produced by ﬁrms of type 2 and itself produces quantity
푥∗1g(퐼푁 , (푓˜
∗2
푁퐼 , 푓˜
∗2
퐼 ) =
(푁 + 2)(푐b − 푏1n + 푑1)
푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2
of green electricity. Government sets ﬁne levels (푓˜ ∗2푁퐼 , 푓˜
∗2
퐼 ) such that
푓˜ 2푁퐼 ∈
[
−(푐b − 푏1n) + 2푏2푥¯푁퐼 ± 휓
√
2푏2
4푏2 + (푁 + 2)2푑2
]
;
푓˜ ∗2퐼 =
[2푏2푁 − 푑2(푁 + 2)2](푐b − 푏1n) + 2(푁 + 2)푏2푑1
푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2
,
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where 푥¯푁퐼 denotes the minimum quota to be produced by a non-innovating ﬁrm, and
휓 =
√
32푏32푥¯
2
푁퐼 − 2(푁 + 2)4휅− 16푏22휇+ (푁 + 2)2푏2휈 + 2푏1n휌+ 2푑2휏
with
휅 = 푟(Δ푏1)
2 − (푐b − 푏1n)푥¯퐼 − (푐b − 푏1)푥¯푁퐼 ;
휇 = 2푟(Δ푏1)
2 + [푁(푐b − 푏1n + 푑1) + 2푑1]푥¯퐼 + [2(푐b − 푏1)− (푁 + 2)2푑2푥¯푁퐼 ]푥¯푁퐼 ;
휈 = (푁 + 2)[(푐b − 푏1n + 푑1)2 + 2푏1n(푐b + 푑1)− 4(푁 + 2)푑2푥¯퐼 ;
휌 = 2(푁 − 2)푑2푥¯퐼 − (푁 + 2)(푐b + 푑1);
휏 = 푥¯푁퐼 [(푁 + 2)
2푑2푥¯푁퐼 − 8(푐b − 푏1)]− 2푐b(푁 − 2)푥¯퐼 − 8푟(Δ푏1)2.
Firms of type 2 innovate (퐼) and each produce quantity
푥∗2g(퐼푁 , (푓˜
∗2
푁퐼 , 푓˜
∗2
퐼 ) =
(푁 + 2)(푐b − 푏1n + 푑1)
2[푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2]
of green electricity.
Proof: see Appendix on p.39.
3.3 Comparison between subsidy and quota-based policy
Under pre-commitment, the subsidy and quota policies again are equivalent in terms of
social welfare. However, the ﬁrms prefer the subsidy policy since they achieve higher proﬁts
than under the quota policy.
Furthermore, as under no pre-commitment, the proﬁts achieved by the potential inno-
vator as well as by its competitors are lower under the quota policy (휋푞) than under the
subsidy policy (휋푠):
휋
푞
1(푁퐼) = 휋
푠
1(푁퐼)− 푓˜ ∗(푁퐼)푥¯푁퐼 ;
휋
푞
2(푁퐼) = 휋
푠
2(푁퐼)− 푓˜ ∗(푁퐼)푥¯푁퐼 ;
휋
푞
1(퐼푁 ) = 휋
푠
1(퐼푁)− 푓˜ ∗(퐼푁)푥¯퐼푁 ;
휋
푞
2(퐼푁 ) = 휋
푠
2(퐼푁)− 푓˜ ∗(퐼푁)푥¯퐼푁 .
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Thus, the ﬁrms have a strict preference for the subsidy policy under pre-commitment, too.
Again, as in the no pre-commitment case, the innovation incentives are higher under
the subsidy policy:
Δ휋푠1 −Δ휋푞1 = 푓˜ ∗퐼푁 푥¯퐼푁 − 푓˜ ∗푁퐼 푥¯푁퐼 > 0. (7)
4 Discussion and Conclusions
Madlener et al. (2009) found that the conventional wisdom related to the equivalence of
tax (subsidy) and quota (certiﬁcate) schemes in terms of static eﬃciency may not hold if
markets for electric power are imperfectly competitive. Due to the inequivalence found in
terms of social welfare, the authors recommend targeted subsidies as being the preferable
policy instrument.
In this paper, we have followed up studying the merits of price and quantity control
policies for promoting renewable electricity generation. In particular, we study the role of
government regulatory pre-commitment when technical innovation is present.
In the pre-commitment case, the government is assumed to stick to its green elec-
tricity policy (in terms of subsidy and quota) even under innovation. Possible reasons for
pre-commitment include: imperfect information, limited ability for short-run policy adjust-
ments etc. Compared to the no pre-commitment assumption, pre-commitment appears to
be more realistic, because in the real world there are always diﬃculties in adjusting poli-
cies, for reasons like the ones described above. Besides, there may be other costs associated
with policy adjustment, similar to the menu costs in the price adjustment case, that further
stymies quick policy reaction to innovations.
We maintain the basic assumptions made in the no pre-commitment case, except that
the quota and subsidy levels remain unchanged after the innovation occurred. We can
conclude that the diﬀerence is larger without pre-commitment, i.e. the subsidy scheme is
preferred more in the case of no pre-commitment.
Thus we ﬁnd that the price (subsidy) policy is again preferred in terms of promoting
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innovation of green electricity technology. The intuition behind the result is also the same
as that under the no pre-commitment case. Since technological improvement and inno-
vation mainly represent the dynamic aspect of energy eﬃciency for a ﬁrm (and also for
an economy), our results strongly support the subsidy policy in terms of its dynamic eﬃ-
ciency in general, no matter which policy regime, pre-commitment or no pre-commitment,
is feasible (or followed) in the real world.
An important ﬁnding concerns the issue whether the existence of equilibrium solutions
depend on pre-commitment. The sets of subgame-perfect equilibria derived in this paper
conﬁrm that pre-commitment can inﬂuence the equilibrium conditions. In particular, under
no pre-commitment a suﬃciently high cost reduction would necessarily lead to innovation
and exclude the possibility that no innovation occurs. By way of contrast, both equilibria
are possible under pre-commitment even if the cost reduction by the innovation is high.
Still, under pre-commitment an equilibrium with innovation remains possible in a case
of a relatively low cost reduction as opposed to the no pre-commitment case. It follows
that a government with a preference for innovations being performed if the achievable cost
reduction is high (and otherwise not) should be in favor of the no pre-commitment regime.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.1.1 Suppose that ﬁrm 1 does not innovate in stage I, i.e. it chooses action 푁퐼.
The subsidy level chosen by the government for all ﬁrms in stage II is 푠푁퐼 . Given a competitive market
in stage III, a representative power generator 푖 faces the optimization problem
max
푥푖b,푥푖g
[푝푥푖b + (푝+ 푠푁퐼)푥푖g − 퐶b(푥푖b)− 퐶g(푥푖g)], (A.1)
where 푥푖b and 푥푖g denote the amounts of electricity produced by ﬁrm 푖 from fossil/nuclear (‘brown’) and
renewable (‘green’) energy sources, respectively, and 푝, the average market price for electricity. The f.o.c.
for an interior solution are
푝 −퐶′b[푥∗푖b] = 0 (A.2)
푝 +푠푁퐼 − 퐶′g[푥∗푖g] = 0. (A.3)
Inserting (A.2) into (A.3) reveals that in an optimum with 푥푖b > 0 and 푥푖g > 0, the government subsidy
푠푁퐼 has to be equal to the diﬀerence (in absolute terms) between 퐶
′
g[푥
∗
푖g] and 푐b, i.e. the marginal costs
of green electricity evaluated at the optimum and the constant marginal cost of brown electricity. The
intuition behind this result from an economic perspective is that if 푠푁퐼 > 퐶
′
g[푥
∗
푖g]− 푐b, then all generators
will exclusively supply green electricity. In contrast, if 푠푁퐼 < 퐶
′
g[푥
∗
푖g]−푐b, no green electricity at all will be
provided. Given the assumptions of a competitive market and homogeneous costs, the subgame solution is
described by (A.2) and (A.3). In particular, all ﬁrms produce the same quantity of green electricity given
by
푥푖g(푁퐼, 푠푁퐼) =
푐b − 푏1 + 푠푁퐼
2푏2
, (A.4)
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while each ﬁrm’s proﬁt amounts to
휋푖(푁퐼, 푠푁퐼) =
(푐b − 푏1 + 푠푁퐼)2
4푏2
. (A.5)
Proof of Lemma 2.1.2 Suppose that ﬁrm 1 innovates and announces to oﬀer 푁 licenses. The
government determines welfare-maximizing subsidy levels 푠푁퐼푁 for non-innovating and 푠퐼푁 for innovating
ﬁrms. We denote the royalty for the new technology per unit of green power as 휐. In equilibrium, it must
not exceed the cost diﬀerence 퐶g(푥2g)− 퐶gn(푥2g), as otherwise there is no incentive to switch to the new
technology.
Subgame Γ퐼푁 ,푁퐼. Suppose that ﬁrms 2, 3, . . . , 푁+1 (from here on: ﬁrms of type 2) rejected ﬁrm 1’s
oﬀer. Then ﬁrm 1 operates with the new cost function 퐶gn(푥1g) while ﬁrms of type 2 continue to operate
with the cost function 퐶g(푥2g). Thus, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt maximization problem is given by
max
푥1b,푥1g
[푝푥1b + (푝+ 푠퐼푁 )푥1g − 퐶b(푥1b)− 퐶gn(푥1g)−푅(푏1 − 푏1n)], (A.6)
while ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt maximization problem corresponds to (A.1) with 푖 = 2 and 푠푁퐼 = 푠푁퐼푁 . Thus,
quantities of green electricity produced by ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrms of type 2 are given by
푥1g(퐼푁 , (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 ), 휐,푁퐼) =
푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼푁
2푏2
;
푥2g(퐼푁 , (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 ), 휐,푁퐼) =
푐b − 푏1 + 푠푁퐼푁
2푏2
,
and ﬁrms’ proﬁts therefore amount to
휋1(퐼푁 , (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 ), 휐,푁퐼) =
(푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼푁 )2
4푏2
−푅(푏1 − 푏1n);
휋2(퐼푁 , (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 ), 휐,푁퐼) =
(푐b − 푏1 + 푠푁퐼푁 )2
4푏2
.
Subgame Γ퐼푁 ,퐼 . Now suppose that ﬁrms of type 2 accept ﬁrm 1’s oﬀer and pay a royalty of 휐 per
unit of green electricity produced. Then all ﬁrms operate with the new cost function 퐶gn(푥g). The proﬁt
maximization problems of ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrms of type 2 are respectively given by
max
푥1b,푥1g
[푝푥1b + (푝+ 푠퐼푁 )푥1g − 퐶b(푥1b)− 퐶gn(푥1g) +푁휐푥2g −푅(푏1 − 푏1n)]; (A.7)
max
푥2b,푥2g
[푝푥2b + (푝+ 푠퐼푁 )푥2g − 퐶b(푥2b)− 퐶gn(푥2g)− 휐푥2g]; (A.8)
the quantities of green electricity produced are
푥1g(퐼푁 , (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 ), 휐, 퐼) =
푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼푁
2푏2
;
푥2g(퐼푁 , (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 ), 휐, 퐼) =
푐b − (푏1n + 휐) + 푠퐼푁
2푏2
.
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The ﬁrms’ proﬁts thus amount to
휋1(퐼푁 , (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 ), 휐, 퐼) =
(푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼푁 )2
4푏2
+푁휐
푐b − (푏1n + 휐) + 푠퐼푁
2푏2
−푅(푏1 − 푏1n);
휋2(퐼푁 , (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 ), 휐, 퐼) =
(푐b − (푏1n + 휐) + 푠퐼푁 )2
4푏2
.
Firms of type 2 decide in stage IIIb whether to reject (푁퐼) or accept (퐼) the oﬀer, depending on the
comparison of the maximum proﬁts calculated for subgames Γ퐼푁 ,푁퐼 and Γ퐼푁 ,퐼 . Thus, their subgame-
perfect equilibrium actions are given as follows:⎧⎨
⎩ 푁퐼 if 휐 > 휐
max := (푏1 − 푏1n)− (푠푁퐼푁 − 푠퐼푁 )
퐼 if otherwise.
In other words, 휐max is the highest possible royalty level at which ﬁrms of type 2 innovate.
Firm 1’s decision in stage IIIb is based on the maximization of its proﬁts w.r.t. royalty level 휐.
Notice that ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt, provided ﬁrms of type 2 accept the oﬀer 휋1(퐼푁 , (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 ), 휐, 퐼), is always
at least as high as if they reject it as long as 휐 ∈ [0, 푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼푁 ]. Moreover, the proﬁt function
휋1(퐼푁 , (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 ), 휐, 퐼) attains its maximum in 휐 at the royalty level 휐 = (푐b− 푏1n+푠퐼푁 )/2. Thus, taking
into consideration the possible case of a corner solution, ﬁrm 1’s equilibrium oﬀer 휐∗ in stage IIIb is given
by
휐∗ =
⎧⎨
⎩
휐max = (푏1 − 푏1n)− (푠푁퐼푁 − 푠퐼푁 ) if (푏1 − 푏1n)− (푠푁퐼푁 − 푠퐼푁 ) <
푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼푁
2
;
푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼푁
2
otherwise.
This oﬀer will always be accepted by a ﬁrm of type 2 in the equilibrium9. Green electricity produced by
ﬁrm 2 in the subgame starting at node 퐺2 thus amounts to
푥2g(퐼푁 , (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 ), 퐼) =
⎧⎨
⎩
(푐푏 − 푏1 + 푠푁퐼푁 )
2푏2
if (푏1 − 푏1n)− (푠푁퐼푁 − 푠퐼푁 ) <
푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼푁
2
;
푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼푁
4푏2
otherwise.
Firms’ proﬁts in this subgame are thus given by
휋1(퐼푁 , (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 ), 퐼) = (A.9)
=
⎧⎨
⎩
(푐푏 − 푏1n + 푠퐼푁 )2
4푏2
−푅(푏1 − 푏1n)+
+푁 [(푏1 − 푏1n)− (푠푁퐼푁 − 푠퐼푁 )] 푐푏−푏1+푠푁퐼푁2푏2 if (푏1 − 푏1n)− (푠푁퐼푁 − 푠퐼푁 ) <
푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼푁
2
;
(푁 + 2)(푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼푁 )2
8푏2
−푅(푏1 − 푏1n) otherwise,
9As usual, we assume that in a case of indiﬀerence ﬁrms of type 2 decide in favor of the adoption of
the new technology.
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휋2(퐼푁 , (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 ), 퐼) =
⎧⎨
⎩
(푐푏 − 푏1 + 푠푁퐼푁 )2
4푏2
if (푏1 − 푏1n)− (푠푁퐼푁 − 푠퐼푁 ) <
푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼푁
2
;
(푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼푁 )2
8푏2
otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 2.1.3 Suppose that ﬁrm 1 innovates but oﬀers no licenses to competitors (퐼0). The
government determines welfare-maximizing subsidy levels (푠푁퐼0 , 푠퐼0). Firm 1, after innovating, operates
with the new cost function 퐶gn(푥1g) and ﬁrms of type 2 continue to operate with the cost function 퐶g(푥2g).
Thus, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt maximization problem is given by
max
푥1b,푥1g
[푝푥1b + (푝+ 푠퐼0)푥1g − 퐶b(푥1b)− 퐶gn(푥1g)−푅(푏1 − 푏1n)], (A.10)
while ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt maximization problem corresponds to (A.1) with 푖 = 2 and 푠푁퐼 = 푠푁퐼0 . The quantities
of green electricity produced by ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrms of type 2 are therefore given by
푥1g(퐼0, (푠푁퐼0 , 푠퐼0)) =
푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼0
2푏2
;
푥2g(퐼0, (푠푁퐼0 , 푠퐼0)) =
푐b − 푏1 + 푠푁퐼0
2푏2
.
Firms’ proﬁts therefore amount to
휋1(퐼0, (푠푁퐼0 , 푠퐼0)) =
(푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼0)2
4푏2
−푅(푏1 − 푏1n); (A.11)
휋2(퐼0, (푠푁퐼0 , 푠퐼0)) =
(푐b − 푏1 + 푠푁퐼0)2
4푏2
. (A.12)
Proof of Lemma 2.1.4 Given the decision of ﬁrm 1 not to innovate, the government anticipates
all ﬁrms’ optimal quantity decisions in the subgame Γ푁퐼 and maximizes the social welfare function
푊푁퐼(푠푁퐼) = 푄
(
푎− 푄
2
)
+ (푁 + 1)휋푖(푁퐼, 푠푁퐼)− 푠푁퐼(푁 + 1)푥g(푁퐼, 푠푁퐼)
+푑1(푁 + 1)푥g(푁퐼, 푠푁퐼)− 푑2[(푁 + 1)푥g(푁퐼, 푠푁퐼)]2 (A.13)
=
(푎− 푐b)(푎+ 푐b)
2
+ (푁 + 1)
(푐b − 푏1 + 푠푁퐼)2
4푏2
− (푁 + 1)푠푁퐼 푐b − 푏1 + 푠푁퐼
2푏2
+(푁 + 1)푑1
푐b − 푏1 + 푠푁퐼
2푏2
− 푑2(푁 + 1)2 (푐b − 푏1 + 푠푁퐼)
2
4푏22
(A.14)
with respect to 푠푁퐼 . The socially optimal subsidy level is thus given by
푠∗푁퐼 =
푏2푑1 − 푑2(푁 + 1)(푐b − 푏1)
푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)
, (A.15)
while the equilibrium quantities and proﬁts are
푥푖g(푁퐼) =
푐b − 푏1 + 푑1
2[푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)]
;
휋푖(푁퐼) =
푏2(푐b − 푏1 + 푑1)2
4[푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)]2
.
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Proof of Lemma 2.1.5 Given the decision of ﬁrm 1 to innovate and oﬀer푁 licenses, the government
anticipates the equilibrium outcomes of subgames Γ퐼푁 ,푁퐼 , Γ퐼푁 ,퐼 , as well as that of the royalty bargaining
subgame, and faces the social welfare function
푊퐼푁 (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 ) = 푄
(
푎− 푄
2
)
+ 휋1(퐼푁 , (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 )) +푁휋2(퐼푁 , (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 ))
−푠퐼푁푥1g(푁퐼, (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 ))−푁푠퐼푁푥2g(푁퐼, (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 ))
+푑1 [푥1g(푁퐼, (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 )) +푁푥2g(푁퐼, (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 ))]
−푑2 [푥1g(푁퐼, (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 )) +푁푥2g(푁퐼, (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 ))]2 .
Since the outcome of the following subgame crucially depends on whether condition
(푏1 − 푏1n)− (푠푁퐼푁 − 푠퐼푁 ) ≥
푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼푁
2
(A.16)
is satisﬁed, the welfare function in stage IIb is a piecewise-deﬁned continuous function. We distinguish
two cases, depending on whether or not condition (A.16) is fulﬁlled.
Case 1: condition (A.16) is satisﬁed. The government maximizes the welfare function
푊퐼푁 (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 ) =
(푎− 푐b)(푎+ 푐b)
2
+ 2(푁 + 1)
(푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼푁 )2
8푏2
− 푅(푏1 − 푏1n)
−푠퐼푁 (푁 + 2)
푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼푁
4푏2
+푑1(푁 + 2)
푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼푁
4푏2
− 푑2(푁 + 2)2 (푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼푁 )
2
16푏22
with respect to (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 ) and subject to constraint (A.16). The socially optimal subsidy level is given
by
푠∗퐼푁 =
[2푏2푁 − 푑2(푁 + 2)2](푐b − 푏1n) + 2(푁 + 2)푏2푑1
푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2
. (A.17)
The maximum welfare level attained in this case is
푊 ∗(퐼푁 ) =
(푁 + 2)2(푐b − 푏1n + 푑1)2
4[(푁 + 2)2푑2 + 4푏2]
−푅(푏1 − 푏1n).
Case 2: condition (A.16) is not satisﬁed. The government maximizes the welfare function
푊 ′퐼푁 (푠
′
푁퐼푁
, 푠′퐼푁 ) =
(푎− 푐b)(푎+ 푐b)
2
+
(푐b − 푏1n + 푠′퐼푁 )2
4푏2
−푅(푏1 − 푏1n)
+푁 [(푏1 − 푏1n)− (푠′푁퐼푁 − 푠′퐼푁 )]
푐b − 푏1 + 푠′푁퐼푁
2푏2
+푁
(푐b − 푏1 + 푠′푁퐼푁 )2
4푏2
−푠′퐼푁
푐b − 푏1n + 푠′퐼푁
2푏2
−푁푠′퐼푁
푐b − 푏1 + 푠′푁퐼푁
2푏2
+푑1
(
푐b − 푏1n + 푠′퐼푁
2푏2
+푁
푐b − 푏1 + 푠′푁퐼푁
2푏2
)
−푑2
(
푐b − 푏1n + 푠′퐼푁
2푏2
+푁
푐b − 푏1 + 푠′푁퐼푁
2푏2
)2
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with respect to (푠′푁퐼푁 , 푠
′
퐼푁
) and subject to constraint (A.16) reversed with <. The socially optimal subsidy
levels are given by
푠′∗푁퐼푁 =
푏2푑1 − 푑2(푁 + 1)(푐b − 푏1) + 푏2(푏1 − 푏1n)
푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)
; (A.18)
푠′∗퐼푁 =
푏2푑1 − 푑2(푁 + 1)(푐b − 푏1n)
푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)
. (A.19)
The maximum welfare level to be attained is
푊 ′∗(퐼푁 ) =
(푁 + 1)(푐b − 푏1n + 푑1)2
4[푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)]
−푅(푏1 − 푏1n).
A simple computation shows that 푊 ∗(퐼푁 ) > 푊 ′∗(퐼푁 ) for any 푁 > 0. Thus, the optimal decision of the
government in stage IIb is given by any combination of subsidies
(푠∗푁퐼푁 , 푠
∗
퐼푁
) =
(
푠∗푁퐼푁 ,
[2푏2푁 − 푑2(푁 + 2)2](푐b − 푏1n) + 2(푁 + 2)푏2푑1
푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2
)
,
where
푠∗푁퐼푁 ≥ (푏1 − 푏1n) +
[푏2(푁 − 2)− 푑2(푁 + 2)2](푐b − 푏1n) + (푁 + 2)푏2푑1
푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2
.
Proof of Lemma 2.1.6 Given the decision of ﬁrm 1 to innovate and oﬀer no licenses, the government
anticipates the equilibrium outcome of subgame Γ퐼0 and maximizes the welfare function
푊퐼0(푠푁퐼0 , 푠퐼0) =
(푎− 푐b)(푎+ 푐b)
2
+
(푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼0)2
4푏2
−푅(푏1 − 푏1n) +
+푁
(푐b − 푏1 + 푠푁퐼0)2
4푏2
− 푠퐼0
푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼0
2푏2
−푁푠푁퐼0
푐b − 푏1 + 푠푁퐼0
2푏2
+푑1
(
푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼0
2푏2
+푁
푐b − 푏1 + 푠푁퐼0
2푏2
)
−
−푑2
(
푐b − 푏1n + 푠퐼0
2푏2
+푁
푐b − 푏1 + 푠푁퐼0
2푏2
)2
with respect to (푠푁퐼0 , 푠퐼0). The socially optimal subsidy levels in this subgame coincide for the innovating
ﬁrm and the non-innovating ﬁrms and are given by
푠∗푁퐼0 = 푠
∗
퐼0
=
푏2푑1 − 푑2(푁 + 1)(푐b − 푏1)− 푑2(푏1 − 푏1n)
푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)
. (A.20)
Proof of Proposition 2.1.7 In stage I, ﬁrm 1 anticipates optimal decisions of the government and
other ﬁrms in the subsequent subgames and thus decides whether or not to innovate (and if so, whether
to oﬀer licenses) based on its maximum proﬁts to be attained given the utility-maximizing decisions of
other players. First of all, observe that, for any 푁 > 0, 휋1(퐼푁 , (푠푁퐼푁 ,푠퐼푁 )) > 휋1(퐼0, (푠푁퐼0 , 푠퐼0)). Thus,
ﬁrm 1 will never take the strictly dominated action 퐼0 in stage I. Consequently, the solution depends on
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the comparison of proﬁts attained from playing 푁퐼 and 퐼푁 :
휋∗1(푁퐼) =
푏2(푐b − 푏1 + 푑1)2
4[푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)]2
;
휋∗1(퐼푁 ) =
(푁 + 2)3푏2(푐b − 푏1n + 푑1)2
2[4푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 2)2]2
− 푟(푏1 − 푏1n)2.
퐼푁 is preferable if 휋1(퐼푁 ) ≥ 휋1(푁퐼). Condition 휋1(퐼푁 ) ≥ 휋1(푁퐼) is satisﬁed if
(푁 + 2)3푏2(푐b − 푏1n + 푑1)2
2[4푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 2)2]2
− 푏2(푐b − 푏1 + 푑1)
2
4[푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)]2
≥ 푟(Δ푏1)2
or, equivalently, if
(푟 − 1)(Δ푏1)2 + 2훽Δ푏1 − 훼훽2 ≤ 0. (A.21)
The solution of ineq. (A.21) depends on the value of concavity parameter 푟. In particular, if 푟 = 1,
condition (A.21) is satisﬁed for Δ푏1 ∈ (0, 훼훽/2). If 푟 > 1, it is satisﬁed for any
Δ푏1 ∈
(
0,
훽
푟 − 1
(√
1 + 훼(푟 − 1)− 1
)]
.
Finally, if 0 < 푟 < 1, this condition is satisﬁed for
Δ푏1 ∈
(
0,
훽
1− 푟
(
1−
√
1− 훼(1 − 푟)
)]
∪
[
훽
1− 푟
(
1 +
√
1− 훼(1 − 푟)
)
,∞
)
.
Thus, the equilibrium outcome depends on the R&D cost of innovation and thus on the marginal cost
diﬀerence Δ푏1. The subgame-perfect equilibrium action of ﬁrm 1 in stage I is given by 퐼푁 for a suﬃciently
low value of Δ푏1 (with the notable exception of the case with 푟 < 1 when suﬃciently large values of 푟
support this equilibrium, too). By way of contrast, if Δ푏1 is too high, then the only action of ﬁrm 1
sustainable in a subgame-perfect equilibrium is 푁퐼.
Proof of Lemma 2.2.1 Suppose that ﬁrm 1 does not innovate in stage I by choosing action 푁퐼.
The ﬁne and the quota levels chosen by the government in stage II are 푓푁퐼 and 푥¯푁퐼 . Given a competitive
market in stage III, a representative power generator faces the optimization problem
max
푥푖b,푥푖g
[푝(푥푖b + 푥푖g)− 푓푁퐼(푥¯푁퐼 − 푥푖g)− 퐶b(푥푖b)− 퐶g(푥푖g)], (A.22)
Quantities of green electricity produced by each ﬁrm and their proﬁts are given by
푥푖g(푁퐼, 푓푁퐼) =
푐b − 푏1 + 푓푁퐼
2푏2
; (A.23)
휋푖(푁퐼, 푓푁퐼 , 푥¯푁퐼) =
(푐b − 푏1 + 푓푁퐼)2
4푏2
− 푓푁퐼 푥¯푁퐼 . (A.24)
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Proof of Lemma 2.2.2 In stage IIIb, ﬁrm 1 innovates and announces to oﬀer 푁 licenses in return
of a royalty of 휐푞 per unit of green electricity. The government determines welfare-maximizing quota and
ﬁne levels (푥¯퐼푁 , 푓퐼푁 ), (푥¯푁퐼푁 , 푓푁퐼푁 ).
Subgame Γ푞퐼푁 ,푁퐼 . Suppose that ﬁrms of type 2 reject ﬁrm 1’s oﬀer. Then ﬁrm 1 operates with the
new cost function 퐶gn(푥1g) while ﬁrms of type 2 continue to operate with the cost function 퐶g(푥2g). Thus,
ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt maximization problem is given by
max
푥1b,푥1g
[푝(푥1b + 푥1g)− 푓퐼푁 )(푥¯푁퐼 − 푥1g)− 퐶b(푥1b)− 퐶1gn(푥1g)−푅(푏1 − 푏1n)], (A.25)
while ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt maximization problem corresponds to (A.22) with 푖 = 2, 푓푁퐼 = 푓푁퐼푁 , and 푥¯푁퐼 =
푥¯푁퐼푁 . Thus, quantities of green electricity produced by ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrms of type 2 are respectively given
by
푥1g(퐼푁 , (푓푁퐼푁 , 푓퐼푁 ), 휐,푁퐼) =
푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁
2푏2
;
푥2g(퐼푁 , (푓푁퐼푁 , 푓퐼푁 ), 휐,푁퐼) =
푐b − 푏1 + 푓푁퐼푁
2푏2
,
with proﬁts therefore amounting to
휋1(퐼푁 , (푓푁퐼푁 , 푓퐼푁 , 푥¯퐼푁 ), 휐
푞, 푁퐼) =
(푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁 )2
4푏2
−푅(푏1 − 푏1n)− 푓퐼푁 푥¯퐼푁 ;
휋2(퐼푁 , (푓푁퐼푁 , 푓퐼푁 , 푥¯푁퐼푁 ), 휐
푞, 푁퐼) =
(푐b − 푏1 + 푓푁퐼푁 )2
4푏2
− 푓푁퐼푁 푥¯푁퐼푁 .
Subgame Γ푞퐼푁 ,퐼. Now suppose that ﬁrms of type 2 accept ﬁrm 1’s oﬀer and have to pay a royalty of
휐푞 per unit of green electricity produced. Thus, all ﬁrms operate with the new cost function 퐶gn(푥g). The
proﬁt maximization problems of ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrms of type 2 are respectively given by
max
푥1b,푥1g
[푝(푥1b + 푥1g)− 푓퐼푁 )(푥¯퐼푁 − 푥1g)− 퐶b(푥1b)− 퐶gn(푥1g) +푁휐푞푥2g −푅(푏1 − 푏1n)];
max
푥2b,푥2g
[푝(푥2b + 푥2g)− 푓퐼푁 )(푥¯퐼푁 − 푥2g)− 퐶b(푥2b)− 퐶gn(푥2g)− 휐푥2g],
The quantities of green electricity produced are
푥1g(퐼푁 , (푓푁퐼푁 , 푓퐼푁 ), 휐
푞, 퐼) =
푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁
2푏2
;
푥2g(퐼푁 , (푓푁퐼푁 , 푓퐼푁 ), 휐
푞, 퐼) =
푐b − (푏1n + 휐푞) + 푓퐼푁
2푏2
,
with proﬁts thus amounting to
휋1(퐼푁 , (푓푁퐼푁 , 푓퐼푁 , 푥¯퐼푁 ), 휐
푞, 퐼) =
(푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁 )2
4푏2
+푁휐푞
푐b − (푏1n + 휐푞) + 푓퐼푁
2푏2
−푅(푏1 − 푏1n)− 푓퐼푁 푥¯퐼푁 ;
휋2(퐼푁 , (푓푁퐼푁 , 푓퐼푁 , 푥¯퐼푁 ), 휐
푞, 퐼) =
(푐b − (푏1n + 휐푞) + 푓퐼푁 )2
4푏2
− 푓퐼푁 푥¯퐼푁 .
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Firms of type 2 decide in stage IIIb either to reject (푁퐼) or accept (퐼) ﬁrm 1’s oﬀer depending on which
of their maximum proﬁts attainable in subgames Γ푞퐼푁 ,푁퐼 and Γ
푞
퐼푁 ,퐼
is larger. Thus, its subgame-perfect
equilibrium actions with respect to the adoption of the new technology are given as follows:⎧⎨
⎩ 푁퐼 if 휐
푞 > 휐푞max :=
√
(푐b − 푏1 + 푓퐼푁 )2 + 4푏2(푓푁퐼푁 푥¯푁퐼푁 − 푓퐼푁 푥¯퐼푁 )− (푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁 )
퐼 if otherwise.
In other words, 휐푞max is the highest possible royalty level at which ﬁrm of type 2 innovates.
Firm 1’s decision in stage IIIb is based on the maximization of its proﬁts with respect to the royalty level
휐푞. Notice that ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt if ﬁrms of type 2 accept the oﬀer 휋1(퐼푁 , (푓푁퐼푁 , 푓퐼푁 , 푥¯퐼푁 ), 휐
푞, 퐼), is always
at least as high as if the oﬀer is rejected as long as 휐푞 ∈ [0, 푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁 ]. Moreover, the proﬁt function
휋1(퐼푁 , (푓푁퐼푁 , 푓퐼푁 , 푥¯퐼푁 ), 휐
푞, 퐼) attains its maximum w.r.t. 휐푞 at the royalty level 휐푞 = (푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁 )/2.
Thus, ﬁrm 1’s equilibrium oﬀer 휐푞∗ in stage IIIb will be given by
휐∗푞 =
⎧⎨
⎩
휐푞max if 휐푞max <
푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁
2
;
푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁
2
otherwise.
This oﬀer will always be accepted by ﬁrms of type 2 in the equilibrium10. The quantity of green electricity
produced by any ﬁrm of type 2 in the subgame starting at node 퐺2, 푥2g(퐼푁 , (푓푁퐼푁 , 푓퐼푁 , 푥¯퐼푁 , 푥¯푁퐼푁 ), 퐼),
thus amounts to⎧⎨
⎩
2(푐푏 − 푏1 + 푓푁퐼푁 )−
√
(푐b − 푏1 + 푓퐼푁 )2 + 4푏2(푓푁퐼푁 푥¯푁퐼푁 − 푓퐼푁 푥¯퐼푁 )
2푏2
if 휐푞max <
푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁
2
;
푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁
4푏2
otherwise.
Firms’ proﬁts in this subgame are therefore given by 휋1(퐼푁 , (푓푁퐼푁 , 푓퐼푁 , 푥¯퐼푁 , 푥¯푁퐼푁 ), 퐼) =
=
⎧⎨
⎩
(푐푏 − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁 )2
4푏2
− 2푁푓푁퐼푁 푥¯푁퐼푁 + (2푁 − 1)푓퐼푁 푥¯퐼푁 −푅(푏1 − 푏1n)
+
푁[3(푐b−푏1n+푓퐼푁 )
√
(푐b−푏1+푓퐼푁 )2+4푏2(푓푁퐼푁 푥¯푁퐼푁−푓퐼푁 푥¯퐼푁 )−(푐b−푏1+푓퐼푁 )
2−2(푐b−푏1n+푓퐼푁 )
2]
푏2
if 휐푞max <
푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁
2
;
(푁 + 2)(푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁 )2
8푏2
−푅(푏1 − 푏1n)− 푓퐼푁 푥¯퐼푁 otherwise,
휋2(퐼푁 , (푓푁퐼푁 , 푓퐼푁 , 푥¯퐼푁 , 푥¯푁퐼푁 ), 퐼) =
=
⎧⎨
⎩
[
2(푐푏 − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁 )−
√
(푐b − 푏1 + 푓퐼푁 )2 + 4푏2(푓푁퐼푁 푥¯푁퐼푁 − 푓퐼푁 푥¯퐼푁 )
]2
4푏2
− 푓퐼푁 푥¯퐼푁
if 휐푞max <
푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁
2
;
(푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁 )2
8푏2
− 푓퐼푁 푥¯퐼푁 otherwise.
10By assumption, ﬁrms of type 2 adopt the new technology if indiﬀerent.
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Proof of Lemma 2.2.3 Now suppose that ﬁrm 1 innovates but oﬀers no licenses to its competitors
by choosing 퐼0. In stage II, the government determines the welfare-maximizing quota and ﬁne levels 푥¯퐼0 ,
푓퐼0 , 푥¯푁퐼0 , 푓푁퐼0 . Firm 1’s proﬁt maximization problem is thus given by
max
푥1b,푥1g
[푝(푥1b + 푥1g)− 푓퐼0)(푥¯퐼0 − 푥1g)− 퐶b(푥1b)− 퐶gn(푥1g)−푅(푏1 − 푏1n)], (A.26)
while ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt maximization problem corresponds to (A.22) with 푖 = 2, 푓푁퐼 = 푓푁퐼0 , and 푥¯푁퐼 = 푥¯푁퐼0 .
Thus, quantities of green electricity produced by ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrms of type 2 are respectively given by
푥1g(퐼0, 푓푁퐼0) =
푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼0
2푏2
;
푥2g(퐼0, 푓푁퐼0) =
푐b − 푏1 + 푓푁퐼0
2푏2
.
Firms’ proﬁts therefore amount to
휋1(퐼0, (푓퐼0 , 푥¯퐼0)) =
(푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼0)2
4푏2
− 푓퐼0 푥¯퐼0 −푅(푏1 − 푏1n);
휋2(퐼0, (푓푁퐼0 , 푥¯푁퐼0)) =
(푐b − 푏1 + 푓푁퐼0)2
4푏2
− 푓푁퐼0 푥¯푁퐼0 .
Proof of Lemma 2.2.4 Given the decision of ﬁrm 1 not to innovate, the government anticipates
all ﬁrms’ optimal quantity decisions in the subgame Γ푞푁퐼 and faces the social welfare function
푊푁퐼(푓푁퐼 , 푥¯푁퐼) = 푄
(
푎− 푄
2
)
+ (푁 + 1)휋푖(푁퐼, 푓푁퐼 , 푥¯푁퐼)− 푓푁퐼(푁 + 1)푥g(푁퐼, 푓푁퐼) +
+푑1(푁 + 1)푥g(푁퐼, 푓푁퐼)− 푑2[(푁 + 1)푥g(푁퐼, 푓푁퐼)]2
=
푎2 − 푐2b
2
+ (푁 + 1)
[
(푐b − 푏1 + 푓푁퐼)2
4푏2
− 푓푁퐼 푥¯푁퐼
]
+(푁 + 1)푓푁퐼
(
푥¯푁퐼 − 푐b − 푏1 + 푠푁퐼
2푏2
)
+
+(푁 + 1)푑1
푐b − 푏1 + 푓푁퐼
2푏2
− 푑2(푁 + 1)2 (푐b − 푏1 + 푓푁퐼)
2
4푏22
.
One can immediately see that both expressions containing the quota levels cancel out. Thus, this welfare
function is identical with that in (A.14) with 푠푁퐼 = 푓푁퐼 . Consequently, the government maximizes the
welfare function with respect to 푓푁퐼 and sets the socially optimal ﬁne level as
푓∗푁퐼 =
푏2푑1 − 푑2(푁 + 1)(푐b − 푏1)
푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)
, (A.27)
while the quota level 푥¯푁퐼 can be deliberately set by the government. The equilibrium quantities and
proﬁts are thus given by
푥푖g(푁퐼) =
푐b − 푏1 + 푑1
2[푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)]
;
휋푞푖 (푁퐼) =
푏2(푐b − 푏1 + 푑1)2
4[푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)]2
− 푏2푑1 − 푑2(푁 + 1)(푐b − 푏1)
푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)
푥¯푁퐼 < 휋푖(푁퐼).
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Proof of Lemma 2.2.5 Given the decision of ﬁrm 1 to innovate and oﬀer푁 licenses, the government
anticipates the equilibrium outcomes of subgames Γ푞퐼푁 ,푁퐼 , Γ
푞
퐼푁 ,퐼
, as well as that of the royalty bargaining
subgame, and faces the social welfare function 푊 푞퐼푁 (푓푁퐼푁 , 푓퐼푁 , 푥¯푁퐼푁 , 푥¯퐼푁 ) speciﬁed below. Since the
outcome of the subsequent subgame crucially depends on whether or not condition
휐푞max ≥ 푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁
2
(A.28)
is satisﬁed, the welfare in stage IIb is given as a piecewise deﬁned continuous function. We distinguish two
cases, depending on whether condition (A.28) is fulﬁlled or not.
Case 1: condition (A.28) is satisﬁed (the ‘otherwise’ case in stage IIIb). The government
maximizes the welfare function
푊 푞퐼푁 (푓푁퐼푁 , 푓퐼푁 , 푥¯푁퐼푁 , 푥¯퐼푁 ) =
(푎− 푐b)(푎+ 푐b)
2
+ 2(푁 + 1)
(푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁 )2
8푏2
−푅(푏1 − 푏1n)− (푁 + 1)푓퐼푁 푥¯퐼푁
+푓퐼푁
(
푥¯퐼푁 −
푐b − 푏1 + 푓퐼푁
2푏2
)
+푁푓퐼푁
(
푥¯퐼푁 −
푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁
4푏2
)
+푑1(푁 + 2)
푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁
4푏2
− 푑2(푁 + 2)2 (푐b − 푏1n + 푓퐼푁 )
2
16푏22
with respect to 푓푁퐼푁 , 푓퐼푁 , 푥¯푁퐼푁 , 푥¯퐼푁 and subject to constraint (A.28). Again, since the quota levels can
be set exogenously, the welfare function is identical with that in the subsidy case. The socially optimal
ﬁne level is given by
푓∗퐼푁 =
[2푏2푁 − 푑2(푁 + 2)2](푐b − 푏1n) + 2(푁 + 2)푏2푑1
푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2
. (A.29)
The maximum welfare level attained in this case is therefore
푊 ∗푞(퐼푁 ) =
(푁 + 2)2(푐b − 푏1n + 푑1)2
4[(푁 + 2)2푑2 + 4푏2]
−푅(푏1 − 푏1n).
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Case 2: condition (A.28) is not satisﬁed. The government maximizes the welfare function
푊
′푞
퐼푁
(푓 ′푁퐼푁 , 푓
′
퐼푁
, 푥¯′푁퐼푁 , 푥¯
′
퐼푁
) =
(푐푏 − 푏1n + 푓 ′퐼푁 )
2
4푏2
− 2푁푓 ′푁퐼푁 푥¯
′
푁퐼푁
+ (2푁 − 1)푓 ′퐼푁 푥¯
′
퐼푁
−푅(푏1 − 푏1n)
+
푁
[
3(푐b − 푏1n + 푓 ′퐼푁 )
√
(푐b − 푏1 + 푓 ′퐼푁 )
2 + 4푏2(푓 ′푁퐼푁
푥¯′
푁퐼푁
− 푓 ′
퐼푁
푥¯′
퐼푁
)− (푐b − 푏1 + 푓 ′퐼푁 )
2 − 2(푐b − 푏1n + 푓 ′퐼푁 )
2
]
푏2
+푁
⎡
⎢⎣
[
2(푐푏 − 푏1n + 푓 ′퐼푁 )−
√
(푐b − 푏1 + 푓 ′퐼푁 )
2 + 4푏2(푓 ′푁퐼푁
푥¯′
푁퐼푁
− 푓 ′
퐼푁
푥¯′
퐼푁
)
]2
4푏2
− 푓 ′퐼푁 푥¯
′
퐼푁
⎤
⎥⎦
+푓 ′퐼푁
(
푥¯′퐼푁 −
푐b − 푏1n + 푓 ′퐼푁
2푏2
)
+푁푓 ′퐼푁
⎛
⎜⎝푥¯′퐼푁 −
2(푐푏 − 푏1 + 푓 ′푁퐼푁 )−
√
(푐b − 푏1 + 푓 ′퐼푁 )
2 + 4푏2(푓 ′푁퐼푁
푥¯′
푁퐼푁
− 푓 ′
퐼푁
푥¯′
퐼푁
)
2푏2
⎞
⎟⎠
+푑1
⎛
⎜⎝ 푐b − 푏1n + 푓 ′퐼푁
2푏2
+푁
2(푐푏 − 푏1 + 푓 ′푁퐼푁 )−
√
(푐b − 푏1 + 푓 ′퐼푁 )
2 + 4푏2(푓 ′푁퐼푁
푥¯′
푁퐼푁
− 푓 ′
퐼푁
푥¯′
퐼푁
)
2푏2
⎞
⎟⎠−
−푑2
⎛
⎜⎝ 푐b − 푏1n + 푓 ′퐼푁
2푏2
+푁
2(푐푏 − 푏1 + 푓 ′푁퐼푁 )−
√
(푐b − 푏1 + 푓 ′퐼푁 )
2 + 4푏2(푓 ′푁퐼푁
푥¯′
푁퐼푁
− 푓 ′
퐼푁
푥¯′
퐼푁
)
2푏2
⎞
⎟⎠
2
with respect to (푓 ′푁퐼푁 , 푓
′
퐼푁
, 푥¯′푁퐼푁 , 푥¯
′
퐼푁
) and subject to constraint (A.28) reversed with <. It can be shown
that, as in the subsidy case, 푊 ∗푞(퐼푁 ) > 푊 ′푞∗(퐼푁 ) for any 푁 > 0. Thus, the optimal decision of the
government in stage IIb is given by any combination of ﬁnes
(푓∗푁퐼푁 , 푓
∗
퐼푁
) =
(
푓∗푁퐼푁 ,
[2푏2푁 − 푑2(푁 + 2)2](푐b − 푏1n) + 2(푁 + 2)푏2푑1
푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2
)
where 푓∗푁퐼푁 satisﬁes inequality√
(푐b − 푏1 + 푓∗퐼푁 )2 + 4푏2(푓∗푁퐼푁 푥¯푁퐼푁 − 푓∗퐼푁 푥¯퐼푁 ) ≥
3
2
(푐b − 푏1n + 푓∗퐼푁 ). (A.30)
In this case, the government’s choice of the quotas 푥¯푁퐼푁 , 푥¯퐼푁 is constrained by inequality (A.30).
Proof of Lemma 2.2.6 Given the decision of ﬁrm 1 to innovate and oﬀer no licenses, the government
anticipates the equilibrium outcome of subgame Γ푞퐼0 . As in other subgames, welfare maximization is
equivalent to the subsidy case. Here we simply state the socially optimal ﬁne level, which is given by
푓∗푁퐼0 = 푓
∗
퐼0
=
푏2푑1 − 푑2(푁 + 1)(푐b − 푏1)− 푑2(푏1 − 푏1n)
푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)
, (A.31)
which is identical for the innovating and non-innovating ﬁrms as in the subsidy case.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.7 Firm 1 anticipates optimal decisions of the government and its com-
petitors in the subsequent stages and thus decides whether or not to innovate (and if so, whether or not
to oﬀer licenses), based on the comparison of its maximum attainable proﬁts given the utility-maximizing
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decisions of other players. In contrast to the subsidy case, the proﬁt functions in the quota case depend
on the quotas set by the government. However, as shown above, the quota levels are not determined from
welfare maximization but set exogenously11.
Here, we assume that the quota level 푥¯퐼 set for any innovating ﬁrm is equal irrespective of its decision
about licenses, 푥¯퐼 := 푥¯퐼푁 = 푥¯퐼0 . Then we can observe that, for any 푁 > 0 and any ﬁne level,
휋1(퐼푁 , (푓푁퐼푁 , 푓퐼푁 )) > 휋1(퐼0, (푓푁퐼0 , 푓퐼0)).
Thus, ﬁrm 1 will never take action 퐼0 in stage I. The optimal decision of ﬁrm 1 depends on the comparison
of maximum attainable proﬁts from choosing 푁퐼 and 퐼푁 , respectively:
휋∗1(푁퐼) =
푏2(푐b − 푏1 + 푑1)2
4[푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)]2
− 푓∗푁퐼 푥¯푁퐼 ;
휋∗1(퐼푁 ) =
(푁 + 2)3푏2(푐b − 푏1n + 푑1)2
2[4푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 2)2]2
− 푟(푏1 − 푏1n)2 − 푓∗퐼푁 푥¯퐼푁 .
퐼푁 is preferable if 휋
∗
1(퐼푁 ) ≥ 휋∗1(푁퐼). As in the subsidy case, 퐼푁 constitutes a subgame-perfect equilibrium
strategy for suﬃciently low values of Δ푏1, namely when the following inequality is satisﬁed:
퐴(Δ푏1)
2 +퐵Δ푏1 − 퐶 ≤ 0,
or, equivalently, for any
Δ푏1 ∈
(
0,
√
퐵2 − 4퐴퐶 −퐵
2퐴
]
. (A.32)
By way of contrast, if Δ푏1 exceeds the threshold value of
√
퐵2−4퐴퐶−퐵
2퐴 , then the only subgame-perfect
equilibrium action of ﬁrm 1 is 푁퐼 (Not Innovate). Note, however, that under the quota policy the
threshold level of Δ푏1 can be inﬂuenced by the government as the quota levels are set exogenously.
Proof of Proposition 3.1.1 In stage III, competition takes place given ﬁrm 1’s decision in stage I
and the government’s decisions in stage II. Notice that subgame Γ˜푁퐼 is equivalent to Γ푁퐼 with 푠푁퐼 = 푠˜푁퐼 ,
subgames Γ˜퐼,푁퐼 and Γ˜퐼,퐼 , respectively, to Γ퐼,푁퐼 and Γ퐼,퐼 with (푠푁퐼푁 , 푠퐼푁 ) = (푠˜푁퐼 , 푠˜퐼), and subgame Γ˜퐼0 ,
to Γ퐼0 with (푠푁퐼0 , 푠퐼0) = (푠˜푁퐼 , 푠˜퐼). The maximum proﬁt levels of ﬁrm 1 in these subgames are therefore
given by:
휋1(푁퐼, (푠˜푁퐼 , 푠˜퐼)) =
(푐b − 푏1 + 푠˜푁퐼)2
4푏2
;
휋1(퐼0, (푠˜푁퐼 , 푠˜퐼)) =
(푐b − 푏1n + 푠˜퐼)2
4푏2
−푅(푏1 − 푏1n);
휋1(퐼푁 , (푠˜푁퐼 , 푠˜퐼)) =
11With the notable exception of stage IIb, in which constraint (5) must be satisﬁed. However, this is
the only constraint for the choice of three variables, 푓∗푁퐼푁 , 푥¯푁퐼푁 , and 푥¯퐼푁 . In other words, for any free
choice of both quota levels, there exists a lower bound for 푓∗푁퐼푁
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=⎧⎨
⎩
(푐푏 − 푏1n + 푠˜퐼)2
4푏2
−푅(푏1 − 푏1n)+
+푁 [(푏1 − 푏1n)− (푠˜푁퐼 − 푠˜퐼)] 푐푏−푏1+푠˜푁퐼2푏2 if (푏1 − 푏1n)− (푠˜푁퐼 − 푠˜퐼) <
푐b − 푏1n + 푠˜퐼
2
;
(푁 + 2)(푐b − 푏1n + 푠˜퐼)2
8푏2
−푅(푏1 − 푏1n) otherwise.
Under the pre-commitment regime, the government (퐺) sets the subsidies without any information
about the innovation decision of ﬁrm 1. Moreover, ﬁrm 1 makes its decision whether to innovate or not
(and if so, whether to oﬀer licenses) prior to the announcement of the subsidy levels set by the government.
Therefore, both decisions can be considered to be made simultaneously and can be modeled as a normal-
form game taking place in stages I and II. In this game, ﬁrm 1 chooses one of three actions {푁퐼, 퐼푁 , 퐼0},
while the government determines a pair of subsidies (푠푁퐼 , 푠퐼).
In a Nash equilibrium of this normal-form game, any equilibrium strategy of a player must belong to
the set of best responses to an equilibrium strategy of the other player. The government’s best responses
(퐵푅퐺) to ﬁrm 1’s actions are equivalent to its actions in stage II in the no pre-commitment case:
푠1 = (푠1푁퐼 , 푠
1
퐼) := 퐵푅퐺(푁퐼) =
{(
푏2푑1 − 푑2(푁 + 1)(푐b − 푏1)
푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)
, 푠퐼
)
: 푠퐼 ∈ ℝ
}
;
푠2 = (푠2푁퐼 , 푠
2
퐼) := 퐵푅퐺(퐼푁 ) =
{(
푠푁퐼 ,
[2푏2푁 − 푑2(푁 + 2)2](푐b − 푏1n) + 2(푁 + 2)푏2푑1
푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2
)
:
푠푁퐼 ≤ 4푏2(푏1 − 푏1n)− 푑2(푁 + 2)
2(푐b − 푏1) + 푏2(푁 − 2)(푐b − 푏1n) + (푁 + 2)푏2푑1
4푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 2)2
}
;
푠3 = (푠3푁퐼 , 푠
3
퐼) := 퐵푅퐺(퐼0) =
=
(
푏2푑1 − 푑2(푁 + 1)(푐b − 푏1)− 푑2(푏1 − 푏1n)
푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)
,
푏2푑1 − 푑2(푁 + 1)(푐b − 푏1)− 푑2(푏1 − 푏1n)
푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)
)
.
Firm 1’s best responses (퐵푅1) to 푠
1, 푠2, and 푠3 can be derived by observing its proﬁts as functions of
subsidy levels given in (A.5), (A.9), and (A.11). Notice that, since the government’s best response to 퐼푁
is given by 푠2 = (푠2푁퐼 , 푠
2
퐼) as shown above, condition (A.16) cannot be violated in a Nash equilibrium.
Therefore, if ﬁrm 1 chooses action 퐼푁 in stage I it faces the proﬁt function
휋1(퐼푁 , (푠˜푁퐼 , 푠˜퐼)) =
(푁 + 2)(푐b − 푏1n + 푠˜퐼)2
8푏2
−푅(푏1 − 푏1n).
Moreover, since 휋1(퐼푁 , (푠˜푁퐼 , 푠˜퐼)) > 휋1(퐼0, (푠˜푁퐼 , 푠˜퐼)) for any (푠˜푁퐼 , 푠˜퐼)), action 퐼0 is strictly dominated and
thus cannot be played in a Nash equilibrium. Hence, action 푠3 = (푠3푁퐼 , 푠
3
퐼) of the government cannot
be supported in an equilibrium since it constitutes a best response to the strictly dominated action 퐼0
only. Action 푁퐼 is a best response of ﬁrm 1 to (푠1푁퐼 , 푠
1
퐼) if 휋1(푁퐼, (푠
1
푁퐼 , 푠
1
퐼)) ≥ 휋1(퐼푁 , (푠1푁퐼 , 푠1퐼)). A
rearrangement shows that this condition is satisﬁed if
푠1퐼 ∈
[
−(푐b − 푏1n)±
√
2푏2
푁 + 2
(
푏2(푐b − 푏1 + 푑1)2
[푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)]2
+ 4푟(Δ푏1)2
)]
, (A.33)
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where Δ푏1 = 푏1 − 푏1n. Therefore, the ﬁrst set of Nash equilibria is given if player 1 does not innovate
and the government chooses (푠1푁퐼 , 푠
1
퐼) with 푠
1
푁퐼 given above and 푠
1
퐼 satisfying condition (A.33). By an
appropriate choice of 푠1퐼 , the government is able to prevent or allow for the occurrence of this equilibrium.
Action 퐼푁 is a best response of ﬁrm 1 to (푠
2
푁퐼 , 푠
2
퐼) if 휋1(퐼푁 , (푠
2
푁퐼 , 푠
2
퐼)) ≥ 휋1(푁퐼, (푠2푁퐼 , 푠2퐼)). After solving
for 푠2푁퐼 , we obtain the following condition:
푠2푁퐼 ∈
[
−(푐b − 푏1)±
√
푏2
(
푏2(푁 + 2)3(푐b − 푏1n + 푑1)2
[4푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 2)2]2
− 4푟(Δ푏1)2
)]
. (A.34)
The second set of Nash equilibria is given if player 1 innovates and announces to oﬀer 푁 licenses, while
the government chooses (푠2푁퐼 , 푠
2
퐼) with 푠
2
퐼 given above and 푠
2
푁퐼 satisfying condition (A.34).
Proof of Proposition 3.2.1 We have shown in section 2.2 that, due to perfect competition, the
optimal decisions of the agents in all subgames are equivalent under subsidy and quota-based policies.
Therefore, we derive the solution by considering the normal-form game obtained after the truncation of
all subgames following the decisions of the government.
In a Nash equilibrium of this normal-form game, any equilibrium strategy of a player must belong
to the set of best responses to an equilibrium strategy of the other player. As in the subsidy case, the
government’s best responses (퐵푅퐺) to ﬁrm 1’s actions are equivalent to its actions in stage II in the no
pre-commitment case:
푓1 = (푓1푁퐼 , 푓
1
퐼 ) := 퐵푅퐺(푁퐼) =
{(
푏2푑1 − 푑2(푁 + 1)(푐b − 푏1)
푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)
, 푓퐼
)
: 푓퐼 ∈ ℝ
}
;
푓2 = (푓2푁퐼 , 푓
2
퐼 ) := 퐵푅퐺(퐼푁 ) =
{(
푓푁퐼 ,
[2푏2푁 − 푑2(푁 + 2)2](푐b − 푏1n) + 2(푁 + 2)푏2푑1
푑2(푁 + 2)2 + 4푏2
)
:
푓푁퐼 ≤ 4푏2(푏1 − 푏1n)− 푑2(푁 + 2)
2(푐b − 푏1) + 푏2(푁 − 2)(푐b − 푏1n) + (푁 + 2)푏2푑1
4푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 2)2
}
;
푓3 = (푓3푁퐼 , 푓
3
퐼 ) := 퐵푅퐺(퐼0) =
=
(
푏2푑1 − 푑2(푁 + 1)(푐b − 푏1)− 푑2(푏1 − 푏1n)
푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)
,
푏2푑1 − 푑2(푁 + 1)(푐b − 푏1)− 푑2(푏1 − 푏1n)
푏2 + 푑2(푁 + 1)
)
.
Firm 1’s best responses (퐵푅1) to 푓
1, 푓2, and 푓3 can be derived by observing its proﬁts as functions
of the ﬁne levels. First notice that, since the government’s best response to 퐼푁 is given by 푓
2 = (푓2푁퐼 , 푓
2
퐼 )
as above, condition (A.16) cannot be violated in a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, if ﬁrm 1 chooses action
퐼푁 in stage I it faces the proﬁt function
휋1(퐼푁 , (푓˜푁퐼 , 푓˜퐼)) =
(푁 + 2)(푐b − 푏1n + 푓˜퐼)2
8푏2
−푅(푏1 − 푏1n).
Moreover, since 휋1(퐼푁 , (푓˜푁퐼 , 푓˜퐼)) > 휋1(퐼0, (푓˜푁퐼 , 푓˜퐼)) for any (푓˜푁퐼 , 푓˜퐼)), action 퐼0 is strictly dominated and
thus cannot be played in a Nash equilibrium. Consequently, action 푓3 = (푓3푁퐼 , 푓
3
퐼 ) of the government
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cannot be supported in an equilibrium since it constitutes a best response to the strictly dominated action
퐼0 only.
Action 푁퐼 is a best response of ﬁrm 1 to (푓1푁퐼 , 푓
1
퐼 ) if 휋1(푁퐼, (푓
1
푁퐼 , 푓
1
퐼 )) ≥ 휋1(퐼푁 , (푓1푁퐼 , 푓1퐼 )). A
rearrangement shows that this condition is satisﬁed if
푓1퐼 ∈
[
−(푐b − 푏1n) + 4푏2푥¯퐼 ± 휉
√
2푏2
(푁 + 2)[푏2 + (푁 + 1)푑2]
]
. (A.35)
The ﬁrst set of Nash equilibria is therefore given if ﬁrm 1 does not innovate and the government chooses
(푓1푁퐼 , 푓
1
퐼 ) with 푓
1
푁퐼 given above and 푓
1
퐼 satisfying condition (A.35). By an appropriate choice of 푓
1
퐼 , 푥¯푁퐼 ,
and 푥¯퐼 , the government is able to prevent or allow for the occurrence of this equilibrium.
Action 퐼푁 is a best response of ﬁrm 1 to (푓
2
푁퐼 , 푓
2
퐼 ) if 휋1(퐼푁 , (푓
2
푁퐼 , 푓
2
퐼 )) ≥ 휋1(푁퐼, (푓2푁퐼 , 푓2퐼 )). After
solving for 푓2푁퐼 , we obtain the following condition:
푓2푁퐼 ∈
[
−(푐b − 푏1n) + 2푏2푥¯푁퐼 − 휓
√
2푏2
4푏2 + (푁 + 2)2푑2
,−(푐b − 푏1n) + 2푏2푥¯푁퐼 + 휓
√
2푏2
4푏2 + (푁 + 2)2푑2
]
. (A.36)
The second set of Nash equilibria is given if ﬁrm 1 innovates and announces to oﬀer 푁 licenses, while the
government chooses (푓2푁퐼 , 푓
2
퐼 ) with 푓
2
퐼 given above and 푓
2
푁퐼 satisfying condition (A.36).
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